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FAIR EMPLOYMENT
AND THE HANDICAPPED:
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
Amy Jo Gittler *
Approximately 27.6 million people suffer from physical or mental
handicaps which affect their ability to work. Yet much of the prob-
lem in providing equal employment to this important segment of
our society lies not in the fact that they are handicapped, but in
the attitudes of others with respect to the ability of these people to
serve as useful employees. In this Article, Ms. Gittler examines
those factors which impede the realization of equal employment for
the handicapped and argues that equal opportunity should be in-
terpreted as reasonable accommodation to the job as well as on the
job itself. The author also analyzes the controlling legal principles
in the area of employment discrimination to determine how the
unique characteristics of this protected class necessitates differences
in both the existing theoretical concepts and the availability of cer-
tain litigation tools. The author also argues that not until
stereotyped assumptions are re-examined with respect to the hand-
icapped will they achieve gainful employment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The handicapped live among us. They have the same hopes, the
same fears, and the same ambitions as the rest of us. They are
children and adults, black and white, men and women, rich and
poor. They have problems as varied as their individual per-
sonalities. Yet, they are today a hidden population because their
problems are different from most of ours. Only the bravest risk the
dangers and suffer the discomforts and humiliations they encounter
when they try to live what we consider to be normal, productive
lives. In their quest to achieve the benefits of our society they ask
no more than equality of opportunity. 1
The mentally and physically handicapped are the burgeoning
minority-emerging from isolation and demanding their rights.
The variety of handicapping conditions and the varying degrees of dis-
ablement render them a fragmented minority, thus diffusing their
collective power, however great their numbers. 2 In addition, dis-
* Associate, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Arizona. B.A., 1972, Oberlin College; J.D., North-
western University. Member of the Arizona Bar. The author wishes to express her gratitude to
Professor Mayer G. Freed at the Northwestern University School of Law, and to John P. Frank,
Martv Harper, and Richard S. Cohen at Lewis and Roca for their assistance.
1. 118 CONG. REC. 3320 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
2. It is perhaps symptomatic of society's attitude toward the handicapped that accurate
statistics of their numbers cannot be obtained. Several reasons have been offered for the ab-
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crimination against the handicapped, particularly in the area of
employment, is pervasive and thoroughly entrenched in our soci-
ety. 3 Therefore, like the minority groups who have preceded them,
the handicapped must rely on the legal system to initiate and effec-
tuate the necessary expansive changes.
The legal tool which handicapped persons initially relied upon for
vindication of their rights in employment was constitutional litiga-
tion. 4  However, because of the inherent limitations in this ap-
proach, 5 state 6 and federal 7 statutes are now the major source
sence of, or inconsistencies in, the statistics: "The difficulty in obtaining accurate and meaning-
ful statistics is attributable to the inability of statisticians to measure the effect of a defined
handicap on the capacity of the handicapped to function normally in society." Note, Abroad in
the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate T~he Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J.
1501, 1501 n.2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Abroad in the Land].
In addition, the inaccuracy and unavailability of statistics has been attributed to the fact that:
The data is collected for diverse purposes. Some figures include those with chronic
diseases; some do not. Some figures only reflect those who are handicapped and are
served by Federal Government programs. Some figures originate from an estimated
number of handicapping conditions-not handicapped individuals, handicapping
conditions.
118 CONG. REC. 3321 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams).
Despite this uncertainty, there are a few statistics worth considering. First, one in every
eleven Americans between the ages of sixteen to sixty-four suffers from disabilities lasting six
months or more. President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, One in Eleven,
Handicapped Adults in America 2 (1975). This figure translates into 11,265,000 persons, or 9%
of the population. Id. However, there are an estimated 22 million adults in the United States
suffering from a physical handicap sufficiently severe to limit in some way their ability to work.
118 CONG. REC. 3320 (1972). An additional 5.6 million persons of all ages are mentally re-
tarded. Id.
3. Statistics on the percentage of handicapped persons who are or could be employed best
demonstrate this point. For example, of the 22 million adults with-physical handicaps of some
severity, an estimated 800,000 are working, while an estimated 14 million could work if given
the opportunity. Of the 5.6 million mentally retarded, 9 out of 10 could work if given the
proper training and rehabilitation. An estimated 33% of the working age blind are employed.
Finally, of the 400,000 persons with epilepsy, only 15-25% are working, although nearly 80% of
them have their seizures under control. 118 CONG. REC. 3320, 3321 (1972); Epilepsy Founda-
tion of America, Answers to the Most Frequent Questions People Ask About Epilepsy 6, 9
(1973); Epilepsy Foundation of America, Chicago Metropolitan Chapter.
4. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); King-Smith v. Aaron,
455 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972); Bevan v. N.Y. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 74 Misc. 2d 443,
345 N.Y.S.2d 921 (S. Ct. Special Term, Albany, 1973).
5. The two primary constitutional arguments are: (1) that the mentally and physically
handicapped constitute a suspect class, thereby triggering a "strict scrutiny" analysis in any case
in which they are excluded as a class, and (2) that the State's total exclusion of individuals with a
specific handicap creates an irrebuttable presumption violative of the Due Process Clause.
The first approach derives from the Supreme Court's traditional application of a two-tiered
analysis in equal protection cases. The more stringent of the two tests is the strict scrutiny test
whereby courts scrupulously examine legislative or state-related classifications to determine the
existence of a compelling governmental interest. This test is applied (1) where the classification
is of a "suspect class," or (2) where the classification affects a fundamental right. In all other
situations a less rigorous test is applied. A governmental classification which neither impinges
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on a fundmental liberty or right, nor involves a suspect class will withstand a .challenge under
the equal protection clause if it is demonstrated to be rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-60 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court has declined several recent invitations to expand the list of suspect classifications
beyond the current list of three, including national origin (Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); race (McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964)); and
alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)). See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688-92 (1973) (only a plurality of the Court regarded sex to be a suspect class); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Court refused to include wealth in
the suspect category).
Despite this reluctance to extend the list, commentators have urged courts to embrace the
handicapped as a suspect class. See, e.g., Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 905-08 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Burgdorfl;
Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advo-
cate, 1976 U. ILL. L. R. 1016, 1033-42 [hereinafter cited as Krass]. The argument is
grounded primarily in language contained in San Antonio Indep. Sch, Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). There the Supreme Court enunciated those factors which constitute a suspect
class, while at the same time rejecting a challenge to the Texas school financing system based
on local property taxation as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The indicia of suspectness
announced by Justice Powell include a class saddled with such disabilities, "[o]r subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
Id. at 28.
However, as the commentators are also quick to point out, there are obstacles which must be
surmounted if courts are to adopt this thesis. In particular is certain language contained in
Justice Brennan's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) which excluded disa-
bility as a suspect class: "And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect statuses as intel-
ligence or physical disability and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." Id. at
686 (emphasis added). As has been noted, this observation was not relevant to the issue of sex
as a suspect classification and as obiter dicta, it is of no precedential value. Krass, supra at
1039.
Perhaps because of the problems and uncertainties in the area of equal protection, courts and
litigators have relied more heavily upon the irrebuttable presumption in cases challenging the
constitutionality of state classifications which exclude handicapped individuals. But plaintiffs
have not always prevailed in these cases. Compare Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1977) (school district policy prohibiting employment of blind teachers creates irrebuttable
presumption violative of due process), with Spencer v. Touissant, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D.
Mich. 1976) (refusal to consider applicants with prior history of mental illness for position as bus
driver not unconstitutional).
Even cases which have held favorably for handicapped plaintiffs, whether based on the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clause, are limited by the Constitution's inapplicability to private
employment. Under either provision, a necessary element is state action. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1833); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
As an alternative approach, one commentator has suggested that private discrimination against
handicapped persons may be remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Note, Abroad in the
Land, supra note 2, at 1512-18. Under § 1981 the right to make contracts and enjoy benefits
equal to those enjoyed by white citizens has been read to prohibit all private and public dis-
crimination in the sale and rental of property. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968). This has been extended to prohibit private racial discrimination in employment, Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 455 (1975); and may include employment discrimina-
tion based on alienage. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 643-54 (5th Cir.
1974). However, this statute is not applicable to sex discrimination. Cf. Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976). Drawing from both the language itself and the judicial interpretations of
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the statute, it is unlikely that any court will adopt the theory that § 1981 protects handicapped
persons from private discrimination in employment.
6. Thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and New York City have some law pros-
cribing discrimination against the handicapped. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (1969); CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 1411, 1413(h), 1432.5 (West 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-1f, 31-126(a) (1973);
D.C. CODE 6-2221 (1977); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1968) (amended 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 413.08(3) (West 1974); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-1(7), -2, -9 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 851-867 (1975); IND. CODE §§ 2 2 -9 -1-3 (q), (1), -13 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. 9 601A.2(11),
.6(1) (West 1972); KAN. STAT. §§ 44-1002(j), -1009(a)(1) (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. 99 207.130(2),
.150(1) (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553.7-A, 4572 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§§ 18(g), 19(a), 20 (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law Co-op 1972); MICH.
STAT. ANN. 9 3.550(103)(b), (202) (Callaghan Statutes Release No. 10 at 761, Oct. 4, 1976);
MINN. STAT. 9 363.01, 363.03(25), (1(2)) (1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Supp. 11 1977);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-305(10), (13), -306(1)(a), -307(1) (Cumin. Supp. 1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(8), -1104, -1108(1) (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. 9§ 613.330, .350(1), (2)
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:3(13), -A:8, (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1,
5(q) (West 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-33-2(k), -7 (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(21), 296(1),
(1-a) (McKinney 1976) CITY AD. CODE ch. I §§ B1-7.0 (3a)(c), BI-7.1 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 128-15.3 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112-01(M), .02(A) (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA.
STAT., tit. 74 ch. 27 § 818 (1972); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.400(a), .425 (Supp. 1977); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-6(H), -7 (Supp.
1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-6A-15 (1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4131 (Supp. 1977);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e, §§ 2(a)(4), 3(f) (Vernon 1975); MT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 498 (1974); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (Repl. vol. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (Supp.
1976); WEST VA. CODE §§ 5-11-3(s), 9 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111-.32(5)(a), (f) (West
1974).
7. At present the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 remains the major federal tool upon which
handicapped persons may rely for statutory actions alleging employment discrimination. 29
U.S.C. § 701 (1973 & Supp. V 1975). Contained within the statute are three major provisions
which affect the employment rights of handicapped persons where the requisite link between
the employer and the federal government is present.
Section 503 of the Act mandates that any persons contracting or subcontracting with the
federal government for services or materials in excess of $2,500 take affirmative action to
employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1973
& Supp. V 1975). Contractors must also include an affirmative action clause in the contract. Id.
Additionally, those with 50 or more employees who hold contracts of $50,000 or more have a
further obligation to maintain an affirmative action program. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(A) (1977).
Among other sanctions, a contractor's failure to comply with the requirements of this provision
may result in termination of the contract in whole or in part. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28(d) (1977),
Section 504 provides that no otherwise qualified handicapped individual "shall, solely by rea-
son of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973 & Supp. V 1975). This provision is particularly applicable to
schools and universities, and is generally enforced by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. Section 503, on the other hand, as it pertains to federal contracts, is administered by
the Office of Contract Compliance of the Department of Labor.
The one other provision of the Rehabilitation Act which affects handicapped persons in the
employment setting is Section 501. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1973 & Supp. V 1975). This section estab-
lishes, inter alia, an Interagency Committee on Handicapped Employees to serve as a watchdog
committee and advise the Civil Service Commission on the general status of employment of
handicapped persons. 29 U.S.C. § 791(a) (1973 & Supp. V 1975). It further requires all execu-
tive agencies to draft affirmative action plans for "hiring, placement, and advancement of hand-
icapped individuals." 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1973 & Supp. V 1975).
The definition of handicapped individual for purposes of Section 501, Section 503 and Section
504 is any person who:
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upon which discrimination claims are based. This Article will focus on
certain concepts which inhere in these laws and discuss their implica-
tions, emphasizing the more difficult conceptual problems and princi-
ples which underlie any statutes protecting handicapped persons from
discrimination in employment. 8
First, the rationale for expanding fair employment laws to include
the handicapped and the means of accomplishing the intended goals
will be examined. Because certain obstacles unique to the handi-
capped must be eliminated before parity in employment opportunities
can be achieved, it will be argued that the concept of reasonable
accommodation 9 is implicit in a prohibition against discrimination
based on handicap. Second, employment discrimination against the
handicapped will be compared with discrimination against other pro-
tected classes, demonstrating that although useful theories can be de-
rived from the existing case law and applied to the handicapped,
(A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities,
(B) has a record of such an impairment, or
(C) is regarded as having such an impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1973) as amended by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-112, tit. 1, 88 Stat. 1619. Both the Department of Labor and the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare supplement this broad statutory definition through the departmental
regulations. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 (Appendix A) (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (1977).
The Rehabilitation Act is a recognition by the federal government of the problems facing
handicapped persons in employment and represents a constructive means of solving those
problems. There exist, however, the inherent limitations that only federal agencies, private
employers with contracts in excess of $2,500, and institutions or programs receiving federal
funds fall within the ambit of the Act. Thus, handicapped individuals subjected to discrimina-
tory practices or policies by employers lacking the requisite affiliation with the federal govern-
ment are excluded.
The most important federal legislation currently available to victims of discrimination in
employment is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V
1975). The protected classes are limited to race, color, religion, sex and national origin.
Amendments to the Act which would add handicapped persons to that list have been proposed
but not enacted. See, e.g., H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. Hl15 (1977),
H.R. 448, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H193 (1977) (would prohibit only discrimination
based on physical disability). In light of the limitations of the Rehabilitation Act as set out
above, the widespread coverage provided under Title VII with its uniform applicability to all
states is necessary if discrimination against handicapped persons is to be effectively and sys-
tematically eliminated. The fact that Title VII extends to virtually all private employers with 15
or more employees is of particular significance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II 1972). This
contrasts sharply with the federal nexus requirement under the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, the
addition of handicapped persons to Title VII has the advantage of providing a federal court
remedy.
8. Several commentators have already analyzed the alternative remedies. See, e.g., Note,
Abroad in the Land, supra note 2; Note, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10
COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 457 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Note, A Proposal); Lang, Employment
Rights of the Handicapped, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 703 (1977).
9. See note 21 infra.
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there are substantial differences which preclude direct application of
the established legal theories to cases involving handicapped persons.
Finally, this Article discusses the class of persons protected under the
statutes who may be properly considered handicapped. 10 Recurring
issues and questions will be raised, and appropriate resolutions
suggested. The intent is to provide a framework for a legislative re-
sponse 11 that reconciles the rights of the handicapped with the
competing interests of employers.
II. DISCRIMINATION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND DEVISING A
CURE
A. An Overview of the Objectives
A large number of physically and mentally handicapped persons
capable of working are unemployed. 12 Fair employment laws, seek-
ing to reduce tnenployment, assume that people of a designated
class could be employed but for certain external factors. The theory
underlying the responsive legislation is that all persons should have
the opportunity to partake in the existing jobs, that employment
should be based on ability and merit, and that artificial barriers
should not be erected or maintained which give one group of persons
a distinct advantage over another.' 3  Conditions which bear on
whether a handicapped person does work include the prejudices and
attitudes of employers, 14 the inaccessibility of information net-
works, 15 the absence of adequate transportation facilities,' 6 and ar-
chitectural barriers. 17 Recognizing that these factors cause the under-
employment of capable handicapped persons, the question remaining
10. For purposes of this Article, "handicapped" will be defined in accordance with the fed-
eral definition under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(6). See note 7 supra.
11. This Article will discuss without distinguishing between the state and federal statutes
proscribing discrimination in employment against handicapped persons. The concepts and prin-
ciples are equally applicable to both.
12. See note 3 supra.
13. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
14. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text infra.
15. Jobs advertised through the more traditional media may be inadequate for some hand-
icapped persons. For instance, deaf persons may not learn about jobs which are advertised on
the radio, while blind persons may not have access to braille copies of daily newspapers which
contain large job advertisement sections.
16. A number of suits have been brought challenging inaccessible transportation systems.
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Snowden v. Birming-
ham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd mere., 551 F.2d
862 (5th Cir. 1977).
17. See text preceding and accompanying notes 23-25 infra.
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is what can reasonably be asked of employers to realize the goal of
making equal employment opportunities for the handicapped.
It has been suggested, particularly in regard to race discrimination,
that the goal of equality exists in two separate senses-equal treat-
ment and equal opportunity to achieve.' 8 This distinction is also
useful in the area of handicapped discrimination where equal treat-
ment will not always guarantee equal achievement. To make a job
available in a building which is inaccessible to mobility-disabled per-
sons, and to reject applicants because they cannot enter the building
may appear to be equal treatment. The person hired may be one
who, despite his or her lesser qualifications, is able to enter the
building. While in some broad sense each is given an equal oppor-
tunity to compete for the job, in this situation equal treatment of the
applicants will never ensure an equal opportunity to achieve.
Accepting the premise that all persons of equal skill should com-
pete equally for jobs, this overall goal can only be effectuated by
providing for the handicapped the opportunity for both equal
achievement and equal treatment. The problem with this solution is
twofold. First, to accept the additional goal of equal achievement op-
portunities for handicapped persons requires not only an additional
commitment by society, but necessitates a leap in the minds of many
as to what constitutes discrimination. Furthermore, the goal of equal
employment opportunities is often considered to be the same for
all classes. Recognizing the need for separate protection for differ-
ent classes requires the additional realization that each class carries its
own legacy, 19 its own unique characteristics and its own problems.
Once this is acknowledged, it becomes clear that even where the
ultimate goal is the same for each, the means of effectuating that goal
will differ with the class and must be tailored to the individual needs.
Attempting to devise a single definition for discrimination and pre-
scribe a single cure only ignores these important differences. 20
18. See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235-45
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Fiss].
19. Id. at 239.
20. This position is reflected in the comments preceding the recently adopted Section 504
regulations where Secretary Califano stated:
There is overwhelming evidence that in the past many handicapped persons have
been excluded from programs entirely or denied equal treatment, simply because
they are handicapped. But eliminating such gross exclusions and denials of equal
treatment is not sufficient to assure genuine equal opportunity. In drafting a regula-
tion to prohibit exclusion and discrimination, it became clear that different or
special treatment of handicapped persons, because of their handicaps, may be neces-
sary in a number of contexts in order to ensure equal opportunity. Thus, for exam-
ple, it is meaningless to "admit" a handicapped person in a wheelchair to a program
1978]
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B. Accommodation
The requirement that employers make a "reasonable accommoda-
tion" to handicapped employees or applicants 2' is a highly controver-
sial aspect of laws which prohibit employment discrimination against
handicapped persons.2 2 But the necessity of this requirement be-
comes clear upon examination of what remains if it is omitted. With-
out requiring an accommodation, the laws would simply prescribe
equal treatment. Prohibiting discrimination against mobility-disabled
persons without requiring an employer to install a ramp at the build-
ing entrance would do nothing to further the opportunities for this
if the program is offered only on the third floor of a walk-up building. Nor is one
providing equal educational opportunity to a deaf child by admitting him or her to
a classroom but providing no means for the child to understand the teacher or
receive instruction.
42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977) (emphasis added).
21. Reasonable accommodation to the handicapped, as discussed throughout this article, in-
volves both alterations to physical structures and modifications to jobs. It may include the in-
stallation of ramps, the assignment of peripheral duties to other employees, the installation of
special equipment, or the rearrangement of furniture. The word "reasonable" implies that not
all accommodations will be required of an employer. The federal regulations, as well as some
state guidelines, import into this requirement two additional concepts.
First, it is assumed here that the accommodation is one which, if made, would permit the
individual to perform "the essential functions of the job." See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k), (1) (1977).
This insures that handicapped persons will not be denied employment in instances where the
basic job can be performed, but other duties have been added which need not necessarily be
performed by that person and which he or she cannot do. For example, a mobility-disabled
person may be fully qualified to perform a clerical job. Traditionally, the person holding that
position may have been the one to deliver the mail to a portion of the building which is inacces-
sible to persons confined to a wheelchair. In that instance, there are three possible accommoda-
tions.
The individual may be hired, and because the daily mail delivery is a nonessential function of
the job, the task may simply be reassigned to another person. In turn, the handicapped indi-
vidual may be assigned an additional task in place of the mail delivery. Alternatively, the place
where the mail was formerly delivered can be changed to a location which is accessible to a
wheelchair. Finally, the inaccessible portion of the building can simply be made accessible.
The second limitation which must be read into the requirement of reasonable accommodation
is that of "undue hardship." See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1977). In any event, an accommodation
which imposes an undue hardship on the employer should not be considered to be reasonable
and hence should not be required. What constitutes an undue hardship will, of course, vary on
a case-by-case basis. For example, what may be required as reasonable for General Motors will
differ from the local grocery store. The federal regulations suggest that among the factors to be
considered for determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship in-
clude the type of facilities, the size of the budget, the type of operation and the cost of the
accommodation. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1977).
22. The federal regulations for both Section 503 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 have read into the corresponding statutory provisions a requirement of reasonable accom-
modation. In addition, a number of states and the District of Columbia include in the statute or
interpretive regulations a requirement of reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., I1l. Guidelines on
Discrimination in Employment, § 3.2(c); WASH. AD. CODE § 162-22-080; D.C. CODE § 6-2202(w).
But see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1432.5.
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class. A requirement of reasonable accomodation addresses the prob-
lems unique to handicapped persons and insures for them the desired
equality in employment and opportunity to achieve.
Two important but independent kinds of accommodations can be
made for handicapped persons. The first, access accommodation, in-
cludes the installation of a ramp or elevator and is wholly unrelated to
actual performance of the job. This form of accommodation is neces-
sary to make a job physically available to a handicapped person. The
other form of accommodation involves adjustments or modifications to
the job itself to permit actual performance of the job duties. To an
applicant or employee, these may be indistinguishable where the ab-
sence of either form of accommodation operates to disqualify him or
her from employment. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the ques-
tion of accessibility separately from accommodation in the employ-
ment setting because their independent relationship to employment
discrimination may not be obvious.
1. Access
(a) Equal Treatment
If the singular goal of equal treatment is adopted, access as a dis-
crimination issue may be unclear because it is assumed that each per-
son starting at the bottom of the stairs is being treated similarly. The
fallacy in this reasoning is that there is an additional operative as-
sumption that all persons at the bottom of the stairs are capable of
climbing stairs and entering narrow doorways.23  These false assump-
tions have resulted in structures flanked with stairs which now prolif-
erate our cities, and which have the additional effect of perpetuating
these assumptions. However, with nearly half a million people in
wheelchairs, 24 and an additional three million who use crutches,
canes, braces, or walkers, 25 these premises are clearly unsupportable.
Legally, equal treatment cannot exist even in the narrowest sense
of "present" equal treatment, without the concomitant requirement of
23. One could argue that by historically providing blacks with inferior educations, to deny
them jobs now because they lack the requisite knowledge is a direct result of the past discrimi-
nation in schools. However, the only response which can be made is to change the present
educational system; the damage resulting from the past educational system has been done.
Similarly, the analogous response for the situation facing handicapped persons is to change the
present buildings. Society need not compensate for the previous exclusions of handicapped per-
sons, it need only insure that they are no longer excluded.
24. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1977,° § 4 (The Week in Review) at 8, col. 1.
25. Id.
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access accommodation. Drawing by analogy from certain Title V11 26
concepts, the reasons are twofold. First, treating handicapped persons
equally with nonhandicapped persons is a facially neutral policy. It
appears to be the very thing required by the fair employment laws.
However, when this policy is applied by employers in inaccessible
buildings, it obviously has a disparate impact upon mobility-disabled
persons. Since the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 27 fa-
cially neutral policies which have the effect of screening out a dispro-
portionate number of persons of a protected class have been held
illegal under Title VII. Griggs challenged an employer's policy which
conditioned initial employment or transfer on a high school education
or passing of a standardized intelligence test.28 The Court held the
tests and job requirements to be violative of Title VII. In so holding,
the Court concluded that Title VII did not require discriminatory in-
tent. Rather, it was sufficient, as in Griggs, that the policies had a
discriminatory and hence illegal impact by excluding proportionately
more persons of a protected class. 29  Under the Griggs analysis,
either equal treatment of the handicapped without access accommoda-
tion is itself a policy illegal tinder the laws or, as suggested here,
equal treatment must be defined to include a requirement of access
accommodation which thereby eliminates the discriminatory impact.
The analysis can be taken one step farther. Equal treatment with-
out architectural alterations has the discriminatory effect of per-
petuating prior discrimination, including the assumptions about
people's ability to climb stairs. In the recent case of United Airlines
26. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See
note 7 supra.
27. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This was the first case in which the Supreme Court interpreted
Title V1I and moust serve as the springboard for any analysis of employment policies.
28. The evidence showed that (a) neither standard was significant in predicting job) perfor-
inance; (b) both requirements disqualified a disproportionate number of black applicants relative
to white applicants; and (c) the jobs in question had traditionally been held by whites pursnant
to a preferential employment policy which the company discontinued when Title V1 became
effective. 401 U.S. at 426-27.
29. The only circumstance tinder which such policies can be maintained is where, despite
discriminatory impact, the policies can be shown to be both necessary for the business and
related to the specific job in question. 401 U.S. at 431.
More recently, the cases of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of
pregnancy-related disability benefits tinder company health plan held not discrimination based
on sex) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring "intent" to discriminate under
the 14th and 5th Amendments) suggested a retreat by the Court and the possible demise of
Griggs and its progeny. But, in the more current case of l)othard v. vawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (statutory minimmn weight and height requirements with a demonstrable disparate im-
pact on women held discrimination under Title VII) the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality
of Griggs.
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v. Evans, 30 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a seniority
system which had the effect of perpetuating prior discrimination.
Subsequent cases 31 have established that the decision in United Air-
lines, was predicated upon the saving clause in Title VII which pro-
tects "bona fide seniority systems."32 Absent this clause and the
existence of a valid seniority system pursuant to which the dis-
criminatory perpetuating practices are maintained, these practices do
constitute unlawful employment discrimination. Under this analysis,
the perpetuation of the prior discrimination reflected in the present
structures is unlawful present discrimination against handicapped per-
sons. By freezing prior discriminatory practices, the current neutral
policies have the discriminatory effect of perpetuating prior discrimi-
nation. The net result is again one of disparate impact on a protected
class. Thus, whether the analysis is one of neutral policies or per-
petuating practices, the conclusion is that access accommodation must
be incorporated into the threshold goal of equal treatment.
Finally, the decision has been made that all newly erected or re-
modeled buildings are to be accessible and effectuating statutes have
been enacted. 33  While such legislation can prescribe certain re-
quirements for future architecture, the problem of inaccessibility of
buildings already constructed is left wholly unsolved by these laws.
Thus, the only way to rectify the existing problems of inaccessibility to
jobs is by imposing on employers the obligation to alter structures
which prohibit entry. 34
(b) Equal Achievement
An analysis of access accommodation under the established goal of
equal achievement, and not just equal treatment, makes the argu-
30. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
31. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977); Par-
son v. Kaiser Alminun & Chemical Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978); Myers v. Cilman
Paper Corp., 556 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1977).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). That Section reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges or employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit svstem ...provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...
33. By 1974, all 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the ftderal government had laws requiring
that new and remodeled buildings be made accessible to the mobility-disabled. Department of
IHealth, Education and Welfare, White [louse Conference on Hlandicapped Individuals, Social
Concerns 68 (1976). See, e.g., The Architectural Barriers Act of' 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (1970).
34. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provides a special deduction for employers for the cost of
removing architectural and transportation barriers. 26 U.S.C. § 190 (1976).
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ment for accessibility alterations even more compelling. Persons of
comparable abilities will never be able to achieve equally if they are
not afforded the same initial opportunities. The starting point of com-
petition must be the job itself and not getting to the job.
Obviously, society cannot and need not compensate for all existing
inequities through remedial legislation. However, the fair employ-
ment laws reflect a policy decision and embody a philosophy that "the
vessel in which the milk is proferred be one all seekers can use." 35
No such equality will exist unless the structures which house the jobs
permit access to all persons.
2. Accommodation in the Employment Setting
(a) Equal Treatment
Reassigning peripheral duties, modifying equipment, or making
flexible work schedules all relate directly to the job and are
closely linked to an employer's own responsibilities and functions.
While the building in which an employer is located may be purely
fortuitous, the job structures or patterns are designed and established
largely by the employer. The problem is that unlike buildings, jobs
and machines must be based much more on an overall norm. Work-
benches must be installed at a single, average height, based on the
assumption that most people will be able to work at that height. The
difference between access accommodation and accommodation in the
employment setting is not only one of numbers but also the ease with
which such adjustments can be made and the appropriate time to
make them.
With 11.7 million mobility-disabled persons in the country, 36 there
exists a high probability that over time a large number of such per-
sons will want to enter a building, and are entitled to do so. Installing
a ramp, placing buttons in an elevator to permit accessibility from a
wheelchair, or putting in braille numbers as well, are relatively easy
adjustments 37 which, while facilitating the movement of handicapped
persons, in no way impair the mobility of nonhandicapped people. It
is, however, unrealistic to expect or require that jobs be designed to
account for the wide variety of handicaps, or with the expectation that
a person with a given handicap may be hired at some future date.
35. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (referring to an old fable).
36. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1977, § 4 (The Week in Review) at 8, col. 1.
37. The cost of installing braille numbers on every selection button in an average elevator is
$3.00; the cost for revamping a 27-story building in Oakland, California, was less than $8,000.
64 Nation's Business 51 (June, 1976).
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Jobs are more properly designed for the average worker who will
undoubtedly constitute most of an employer's work force. On the
other hand, when a handicapped person applies for a job which he or
she could perform if a workbench was lowered or a special tool pro-
vided, applying a standard of equal treatment without accommodation
results in denying employment to that person. The effect is that the
applicant is treated like all others and denied employment if unable
to perform the job "as is".
Unlike the access situation, applying a standard of equal treatment
in the job setting does not of necessity compel the additional re-
quirement of reasonable accommodation. Therefore, the overall pur-
pose of fair employment laws for the handicapped must be
reevaluated to determine whether those purposes necessitate the ad-
ditional goal of equal achievement and, accordingly, reasonable job
modification.
(b) Equal Achievement
Merit and. skill are the bases upon which handicapped and nonhan-
dicapped people must ultimately be judged for employment. But
performance of the job duties or execution of the tasks may be ham-
pered by the handicap itself, and it is those cases in which the addi-
tional requirement of reasonable accommodation is relevant. This
situation is to be distinguished from the case where the handicap
prohibits the possibility of satisfactory performance altogether.
By focusing on the goal of equal opportunity to achieve and at-
tempting to provide handicapped persons with the chance to compete
equally with nonhandicapped persons, the need for accommodation to
the job becomes compelling. The accommodation will be required
where the individual possesses the ability but is simply hampered to
a limited extent by a handicap. Requiring an accommodation ensures
that the individual will be able to compete effectively with other
applicants which, in turn, permits equal opportunities for the hand-
icapped. Stated otherwise, the absence of an accommodation will pre-
clude handicapped persons from equal achievement. Once the initial
determination is made that handicapped persons, like nonhandicap-
ped persons, should be afforded comparable chances for employment
and should be permitted to achieve equally, the requirement of
reasonable job modification is a natural correlate.
It is appropriate that fair employment laws generally be construed
in light of their purpose of extending to all protected persons the
opportunity to engage in gainful employment. An interpretation of
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the statutes must evolve which best accomplishes that purpose. 38
Only by incorporating the concept of reasonable accommodation into
fair employment for the handicapped will the objective of equal
employment opportunity guarantee the possibility of employment to
the greatest number of handicapped persons. 39
38. Numerous state statutes prohibit discrimination based on handicap "'unrelated to abil-
ity." See, e.g., Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Viriginia, supra note 6. This
may be interpreted as ability to perform a given job, or overall capability. It is probably the
former interpretation which is intended. However, if the requirement of reasonable accommo-
dation is included, then the statutory wording is improper. Accommodations are necessary only
in those cases where the handicap affects ability but does not prohibit performance altogether.
In such situations the handicap is never "unrelated to ability" unless this is read as "unrelated to
ability to perform a job with reasonable accommodation."
39. The Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977) does not dictate a different conclusion or lesser requirements. There, the Supreme Court
set down the standards for reasonable accommodation to religion under Title VII. The case dealt
primarily with the extent of an accommodation necessary for a collective bargaining agreement
then in effect. Essentially, tle court held that where (1) there is no additional cost to the
employer for an accommodation, or the cost of a possible accommodation is de minimis; or, (2)
an accommodation can be fashioned without displacing other employees or affecting their pref-
erences, the employer must make the accommodation.
To the extent that this article suggests more of an accommodation than what was required
there, that case is not controlling. First, accommodation to religion involves certain First
Amendment rights which have long been held by the Court to be sacrosanct. See, e.g., Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (striking down on First Amendment grounds a state law
which was interpreted to preclude a Seventh Day Adventist from receiving unemployment ben-
efits because her religion prohibited her from working on Saturdays). See also Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down prayers in school as violative of the Establishment Clause).
Although not specifically discussed in Hardison, the Establishment Clause clearly prohibits
Congress from requiring employers to accommodate one employee to the extent of encroaching
upon the religious practices of another employee. These First Amendment concerns are totally
absent in cases involving handicapped individuals.
Second, unlike religion, and with a few exceptions noted elsewhere (see text accompanying
and following notes 119-21 infra), handicaps are not voluntarily acquired and cannot be con-
trolled. A person may choose a religion and voluntarily subscribe to its teachings and practices.
Even in the case of temporary disabilities, to the extent these are included under the protection
of these laws, the healing process cannot be accelerated and the conditions are still involitional
and unalterable. This suggests much more compelling reasons for requiring an accommodation
to a handicapped person than to a person practicing a particular religion.
Finally, of the kinds of accommodations that are suggested here, many of them would not
affect other employees. The installation of ramps or equipment, or modification of equipment to
accommodate an individual are all accommodations which would not displace other employees.
The only type of accommodation which might affect other employees would be the delegation of
peripheral duties to other employees in order to permit the handicapped individual to perform
the "essential functions" of the job. But available statistics indicate that the number of instances
in which this form of accommodation will be required is slight. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,325 (1976).
(Studies reported there indicate that of 397 severely disabled persons who were placed in jobs,
317 persons required no restructuring of assigned tasks and 62 persons required only incidental
modifications.)
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III. FAIR EMPLOYMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Race, Sex, and Handicap
1. Overall Comparison
Any reference to blacks or women embraces a uniform class of in-
dividuals-all persons with black skin, all persons of the female sex.
But to speak of the handicapped as a class does little to further an
analysis. The term "handicapped" includes many people with differ-
ent disabilities of varying degrees of severity. For instance, included
among epileptics are the fifty percent who are seizure free with the
prescribed medication, 40 and the thirty percent who can control their
seizures with medication. 41 Similarly, persons with a history of men-
tal illness may include those who have had nervous breakdowns,
those who are diagnosed schizophrenics, and those with intellectual
disabilities.
But the most significant difference between the handicapped and
other protected classes is the fact that the condition which initially
gives rise to the protective status may also affect an individual's job
performance. A handicap may limit ability altogether. As a result,
blind people can be lawfully denied employment as bus drivers; per-
sons confined to wheelchairs can be lawfully refused consideration as
dancers. On the other hand, a blanket exclusion cannot be applied
with the same certainty to any other protected class. Some women
might be able to lift a specified weight and some might not. 42 And
while we may permit an employer to refuse to hire a man for a
female role in a play, this is not because the male is unable to per-
form the part, or cannot be dressed in women's clothing. Rather, it is
because we will allow the employer to demand that degree of authen-
ticity as a qualification for the job. 43
Other handicaps touch on performance without excluding individu-
als altogether. For example, blindness may affect a teacher's ability to
perform every facet of a job. But this does not mean that a blind
40. Epilepsy Foundation of America, Answers to the Most Frequent Questions People Ask
About Epilepsy 8 (1975).
41. id. at 9.
42. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)
(company failed to establish that all or substantially all women could not lift weight in excess of
30 pounds).
43. The Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(d)(2) (1977), state the fol-
lowing: "Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission
will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification .... .
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person cannot teach." Similarly, a deaf person may be able to com-
petently perform a clerical job, but be unable to answer the tele-
phone unless a specially designed phone is installed. a5 Absent from
the other protected classes is this correlation between the distin-
guishing trait and the ability to work.
An employer's refusal to hire or promote a handicapped person is
premised on a variety of factors including fears of increased costs, 46
safety,'47 and stereotyped assumptions which frequently underesti-
mate the capabilities of a handicapped person.4 8 Race discrimina-
44. The court's opinion in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
aff'd., 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), best illustrates this point:
Some of the potential problem areas studied by Dr. Huntington were lunchroom
and study hall supervision, teacher safety, administering tests, use of visual aids and
chalk board, keeping written records, maintaining discipline and pupils' attention,
and teaching various subjects. In schools where blind teachers were employed these
problems either did not arise or were overcome through special arrangements. For
example, Dr. Huntington found that the great majority of blind teachers maintained
average or better than average classroom discipline. Blind teachers frequently were
not assigned to lunchroom or playground supervision. Most blind teachers had no
trouble operating audio-visual equipment and the majority were able to use the
chalk board. However, blind teachers frequently used students to write on the
blackboard or distribute mimeographed materials. For administering tests, either no
special arrangements were made or the blind teachers used teachers who had study
halls or students as proctors. A blind teacher could keep written records through
use of braille or a typewriter. School administrators reported that English was the
second most feasible subject (after social studies) for a blind teacher. Finally, school
administrators who supervised blind teachers reported that the great majority were
average or above average teachers.
411 F. Supp. at 986.
45. Teletypewriters (TTY's) permit the deaf to communicate by phone through systems
similar to telegraphs.
46. Specifically, employers fear the expenses involved in accommodations, increases in in-
surance and workmen's compensation premiums, and greater liability resulting from subsequent
injuries. Additionally, employers fear that handicapped workers will produce less, thereby in-
creasing production costs. See Nagi, McBroom & Collette, Work, Employment, and the Dis-
abled, 31 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 21, 27 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Nagi & Collette]. This
Article represents the most comprehensive collection of individual studies on employer pre-
judices.
47. Employers' fears in regard to safety are particularly strong in the employment of persons
with a history of mental illness. Id. See also Olshansky, Grob & Malamud, Employers' Attitudes
and Practices in the Hiring of Ex-Mental Patients, 42 MENTAL HYGIENE 391, 394-95 (1958).
However, studies regarding safety of both mentally and physically handicapped persons in the
employment setting indicate that the fears harbored by employers are largely unfounded. See
Wolfe, Disability Is No Handicap for DuPont, THE ALLIANCE REV. 13 (Winter 73-74);
Kalenik, Myths About Hiring the Physically Handicapped. 2 JoB SAFETY AND HEALTH 9, 11
(Sept. 1974). These findings have been contirmed in other reported studies. See, e.g., Nagi &
Collette, supra note 46 at 23 citing Ling, An Investigation into the Readjustment to Work of
Psychiatric Cases, I INT'L J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 18 (Autumn, 1955).
48. One study indicated that handicapped persons must generally be more qualified or
competent than nonhandicapped persons in order to compensate for the existing attitudes and
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tion, on the other hand, may be based upon prejudices and general
hostility toward persons of another race, '4 as well as assumptions re-
garding their abilities. Sex discrimination may be based largely upon
assumptions regarding the capabilities of women. A direct correlation
between a handicap and ability may be real or presumed; a direct
correlation between race or sex and an individual's ability may be
perceived by an employer. These perceptions may operate in the
same fashion to exclude a handicapped person, a black or a woman
from employment.
Other prejudices are operative in the employment decisions re-
garding handicapped persons. The images of our society portray only
those persons who are able-bodied. In addition, because of persisting
paternalism and discrimination, the mentally5" and physically hand-
icapped have been effectively excluded from participation in the
mainstream of society. 51 Because of their limited visibility until re-
cently, and the limited experience which the general population has
had in living and working with handicapped persons, prejudices
based upon ignorance have gone unchallenged. Generally, nonhand-
icapped persons feel uncomfortable around handicapped persons, par-
ticularly those with visible handicaps. 52  These attitudes, whether
assumptions. Rickard, Triandis & Patterson. Indices of Employer Prejudice Toward Disabled
Applicants, 45 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 52 (1953).
49. See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV, L. REv. 380,
383-84 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Age Discrimination].
50. Historically, society has either institutionalized the mentally ill or driven them away.
Burgdprf, supra note 5, at 883-91. See also N.N. KiTIrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 56-65
(1971). Additionally, they are denied certain fundamental rights touching upon all aspects of
their lives-voting, marriage, and the right to bear children. See generally S. BRAKEL & R.
ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1971); Burgdorf, supra note 5, at 861-63, 887.
The problem of employment for persons with a history of mental illness is particularly acute.
Studies show extremely low rates of employment for former mental patients. Miller & Dawson,
Effects of Stigma on Re-employment of Ex-mental Patients, 49 MENTAL HYGIENE 281, 282-83
(1965).
51. The exclusion of mentally and physically handicapped persons from our society com-
mences at an early stage. The process begins in school where children may be assigned to
special programs designed for the handicapped, or misclassified and unnecessarily placed in
special education programs. Krass, supra note 5, at 1017-23. Thereafter they may be excluded
from participation in society because of the stigma which attaches with the special education
programs, the physical inaccessibility of buildings, or the institutionalization noted supra note
50.
52. See Kriegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38
AM. SCHOLAR 412 (1969). There the author, himself handicapped, writes: "The cripple, then, is
a social fugitive, a prisoner of expectations molded by a society that he makes uncomfortable by
his very presence." Id. at 416.
Another writer, paralyzed from the shoulders down, observed: "I have been served meals in
separate dining areas of restaurants since, as the owners were quick to point out, I might upset
the other customers and lessen their enjoyment of the meal." NEWSWEEK, November 1, 1976,
at 13.
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conscious or unconscious, operate in the employment setting to
deny handicapped persons jobs which they can capably perform.
While legally the preferences of clients or customers cannot be the
basis for refusing to hire or discharging a member of a protected
class, 53 the prejudices may operate on one level where the employer
ostensibly denies employment to a handicapped person for other
reasons.
Potentially, the same arbitrary, irrational employment decisions
which were made vis-,a-vis blacks are also made against handicapped
persons. And in all but a few possible instances, handicapped per-
sons, like blacks and women, lack individual control over their hand-
icap status. 54 This factor distinguishes the handicapped from persons
protected on the basis of religious preferences and practices which,
while premised on strong fundamental beliefs, are nonetheless voli-
tional. With a few possible exceptions, 5 handicap, like race or sex, is
an immutable characteristic. 56 However, unlike blacks or women,
the handicapped are plagued by the additional factor that their condi-
tion can render them incapable of specified work.
Like blacks and women, the handicapped have historically been
subjected to unequal treatment. 57 For this reason, the mandates im-
posed by fair employment laws are the same for all protected classes.
The fact that a handicap may bear on ability does not compel an
outcome different from other protected classes. Rather, the basic
principles and prohibitions which have evolved since Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 58 are generally controlling for mentally and physically
handicapped persons. This general applicability is then modified by a
few specific aspects of the law which, as they unfold, will result in the
evolution of concepts unique to the law of handicap discrimination.
53. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971).
54. Fiss, supra note 18, at 241-43.
55. Some handicaps arguably protected under the fair employment statutes are not involun-
tary. Most notably these conditions include alcoholism and obesity. See text accompanying notes
118-121 infra.
56. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (protection
of Title VII in sex discrimination case restricted to immutable characteristics).
57. See Burgdorf, supra note 5, at 861-99. (There the author discusses the unequal treatment
to which handicapped persons have been subjected and the specific inequities existing in educa-
tion and institutions).
58. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
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2. Evidentiary Considerations: Statistical Data and Burden of Proof
a. Generating Statistical Data
Statistical data is often used to prove both individual instances of
discrimination and systemic discrimination as well. 59 These statistics
come in a variety of forms. For instance, in employment cases alleg-
ing discrimination on the basis of race or sex, statistics may be intro-
duced to show the number of minorities or women currently
employed by the defendant employer. Statistics may also be intro-
duced to show the number of minorities or women available in the
relevant applicant pool. Finally, statistics may be introduced to show
a disparity between the overall number of minorities or women in the
employer's total work force, and the number of minorities or women
in higher level positions. In any case, statistics are often used to bol-
ster a prima facie showing of discrimination. 60
Recently, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of statistics
and their relevance in Title VII cases.6 1 In International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, 62 the Supreme Court observed
that statistical analyses do serve a vital role in establishing the exis-
tence of discrimination, but their usefulness "depends on all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances." 63 Thus a comparative analysis
between the percentage of minorities in the employer's work force
and the percentage in the general areawide population may be highly
probative where the necessary job skill is slight.64 On the other
hand, when the challenged discrimination involves a job requiring
specialized training or skill, the relevant labor market becomes the
percentage of persons of a designated class in the areawide population
who possess that training or skill. 65
For several reasons, the handicapped will not have the additional
tool of statistics in proving either individual or systemic discrimina-
tion. First, meaningful statistics cannot be obtained for the handicap-
ped because of the virtual absence of handicapped persons in the
labor market relative to the number of persons employed.6 6 The
59. G. COOPER, H. RABB, & H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION TEXT AND MA-
TERIALS FOR STUDENT AND PPACTIONER 83, 114 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COOPER & RABB].
60. See Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. -Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977) and cases
cited therein.
61. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). See also International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 331-42 (1977).
62. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
63. Id. at 340 & n.20.
64. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977).
65. Id.
66. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
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data will always show that few if any handicapped are currently
employed by the defendant employer compared to the number of
handicapped persons in the overall population. The obvious effect is
that any statistics introduced in support of a handicapped individual's
charge would not be significantly probative of the issue of discrimina-
tion. Otherwise, if the statistics were given the same weight for
handicapped persons as they are for blacks or women, the handicap-
ped plaintiff would always prevail.
Second, there is no definable class or relevant labor pool which can
even be ascertained. The variety of handicaps and gradations in sev-
erity of these conditions contribute in part. While women may be
regarded as a class without further distinction, the handicapped may
be studied either as a general class or as a subclass divided according
to the particular handicap or severity of the impairment. Though it
may be argued that subclasses are irrelevant when comparing overall
statistical data, the fact that an employer employs fifteen epileptics is
not necessarily probative of whether he or she has discriminated
against a blind person. This then leads to the next consideration.
There are a number of ways of dividing up the general class of
handicapped individuals. The most obvious breakdown is between
physical and mental handicaps. There is also a breakdown between
visible and nonvisible handicaps. This latter distinction mitigates
against grouping all handicapped persons together. The employment
of one group does not imply employment of the other group. For
example, an employer may attempt to create the appearance of com-
pliance with the law by employing several epileptics, or cured cancer
patients, while at the same time refusing to hire the more visibly and
severely handicapped. Or, an employer may simply discriminate
against persons with one handicap, whether visible or not, without
necessarily discriminating against handicapped persons as a class.
Furthermore, it may be extremely difficult to produce any useful
comparative data regarding the potential applicant pool either within
the local area or the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
(SMSA). 67 Proof of population percentages is currently derived from
the United States Census data, 68 but statistics and numbers of hand-
icapped persons were not even included in the census until 1970.69
67. The SMSA is the area which includes a city and its outlying suburbs. The total area is
commonly used to ascertain the existing applicant pool in an urban center.
68. COOPER & RABB, supra note 59, at 84.
69. President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, One in Eleven, Handi-
capped Adults in America 1 (1975).
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Even now, these statistics exist only for the physically handicapped.
Given the vague definition of handicap which is used, 70 the fact that
such statistics will depend in many instances on individuals disclosing
their handicaps and the reluctance of some to do so, 71 such informa-
tion is simply not helpful in establishing an areawide labor pool.
The only plausible pool which could be probative of discrimination
against an individual with a given handicap would be one containing
statistics which relate to persons with that handicap in the areawide
labor pool and who possess the requisite skill or training, to the ex-
tent this is required. But even if disparities could be shown between
the employment statistics of the employer and the relevant labor
pool, such statistical analyses would be so small as to have little legal
significance, 72 or predictive value. The fact that statistics cannot be
generated, and if generated cannot be used for proving employment
discrimination agaihst handicapped persons, becomes relevant be-
cause of the extent to which it affects the problem of proof in an
individual case.
b. Legal Analysis
As it has developed, the law on employment discrimination deals
primarily with two situations. The first is the situation where an
employer maintains a policy which, although neutral on its face, has
the unlawful effect of screening out a disproportionate number of per-
sons of a protected class. 73  Proof of discrimination in this kind of
case does not depend upon statistical data, except to the extent that
statistics are needed to prove the disparate impact.74 But in most
cases involving the handicapped, this will be unnecessary. For exam-
ple, a validated written test may be challenged by a blind person who
is precluded from taking the test, but who is otherwise qualified for
70. The definition is actually stated in terms of a question: "Does this person have a health
or physical condition which limits the kind or amount of work he can do at a job? Does his
health or physical condition keep him from holding any job at all?" Id.
71. This reluctance may stem from the fact that these people are aware of the existing
prejudices against handicapped persons and are self-conscious about disclosing their condition to
others.
72. See Morita v. Southern California Permamente Medical Group, 541 F.2d 217, 220 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977); Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271, 1273
(5th Cir. 1975). Both courts found the meager statistics submitted by the plaintiffs to be too few
to support or establish a finding of discrimination.
73. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
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the job. Here the discriminatory effect can be easily demonstrated
without statistics. 75
The other common employment discrimination case, represented
by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 76 is one involving individual
allegations of discrimination. In McDonnell Douglas the Supreme
Court set down four showings which the plaintiff must make to estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff must show (1)
membership in the protected class; (2) application and qualification
for the job; (3) rejection despite qualifications; and (4) that, after the
rejection, the position remained open and applications were
sought. 77 Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the
employer to come forth with a nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting
or failing to promote the plaintiff.78  If the employer meets this bur-
den, the plaintiff must then prove the purported reason to be pretex-
tual. 79 This is the typical case in which statistics are used, and the
situation in which the absence of statistics will work to the detriment
of an individual.
The key issue is what effect the absence of statistics will have on
the burden of proof for handicapped individuals. In the case where
an applicant is rejected pursuant to an overt policy 'which ex-
cludes persons with an identifiable handicap, 80 the statistical evi-
dence is unimportant. However, because it is the initial burden of
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, 81 and because it is so well
accepted that negative statistics may raise an inference of discrimina-
tion, 82 handicapped persons may encounter difficulty in making out
the initial prima facie case necessary to shift the burden to the
employer in the McDonnell Douglas situation.
The alternatives facing handicapped plaintiffs are to either retain
the McDonnell Douglas standard of proof or to replace that standard
with a different burden of proof and mode of analysis. This second
75. The test itself may be an otherwise valid test. However, the fact that the test is only
available in printed form converts the administration of the test from a policy neutral on its face
to one which has a discriminatory impact upon a protected class (blind persons).
76. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
77. Id. at 802.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 804.
80. Some of the more common instances of such discrimination include company policies
prohibiting employment of persons with a history of heart disease; policies prohibiting the
employment of persons who may be considered poor insurance risks; and refusal to hire cured
cancer patients until five years after treatment. Wall Street Journal, July 20, 1976, at 1, col. 1;
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 1. In addition, a number of school systems have
refused to hire blind teachers. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977);
King-Smith v. Aaron, 455 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972).
81. 411 U.S. at 802.
82. See Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977).
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alternative poses the additional problem of developing an appropriate
means of measuring qualifications other than that set down in
McDonnell Douglas. A thorough reading of the case, and thoughtful
consideration of the question, indicates that the burden of proof es-
tablished there by the Supreme Court is most appropriate for all pro-
tected classes, including the handicapped. However, in applying this
standard, courts will have to remain cognizant of the fact that statis-
tics simply will not be available to the extent they have been in other
areas of discrimination. This factor, coupled with the additional evi-
dence necessary to prove "ability," does not mean that handicapped
individuals should necessarily have to produce less evidence to prove
their cases than other protected persons. But at the outset, more
creative approaches may have to be used in order to establish a case
of discrimination than with, for example, blacks or women.
The absence of statistical data is exacerbated by an additional fac-
tor. If a court accepts the premise of this article, the term qualified
must be interpreted to include qualified with a reasonable accommo-
dation. But to make even a showing of qualification, a handicapped
person may be forced to come forth with medical proof and vocational
experts. Judges have not been immune from the stereotypes and as-
sumptions about handicapped persons. Thus, before proving his or
her qualifications for a given job, a handicapped individual may ini-
tially have to disprove some of the assumptions in our society re-
garding the extent to which a given handicap impairs an individual's
ability to perform a job. The initial hurdle in the courtroom may be
as much a problem of education as of proof.
In conclusion, the shifting burden of proof and initial requirements
necessary for a prima facie case of discrimination can remain basically
the same in individual cases regarding the handicapped. However,
the kind of proof which will be submitted to make the requisite
showing will be substantially different from other kinds of discrimina-
tion cases. In place of statistics, medical evidence will be relevant and
vocational experts may be called upon. What must be avoided is the
assumption that in applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to cases
involving tfie handicapped, the kind of evidence will also be the
same.
B. Age
1. Overall Comparison
Because a person's physical capabilities are often impaired by the
aging process, 83 age is perhaps most like a handicap. Discrimination
83. Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination
Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 839, 848-65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kovarsky].
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based on age may be attributed to an employer's perceptions and
estimates of the abilities of an applicant or employee and the correla-
tive assumptions regarding diminished levels of productivity and di-
minished work capacity.84 But older workers may be less the victims
of disdain or prejudice 8 5 than handicapped workers who are subjected
more to generalized assumptions which operate to exclude them from
jobs in the work force. Age discrimination has been distinguished
from race discrimination on the basis that the latter is premised
largely upon general hostility and bigotry and which is less likely to
correspond with ability.86 Handicap discrimination, rooted in both
prejudices and the perceived or actual impairment of ability, falls
somewhere between the two. 87
Aging is an evolving process which results in the deterioration of
body cells, 88 and increasing risks of diseases and medical conditions.
Handicaps, on the other hand, are frequently impairments or dis-
abilities which are either congenital or the result of accidents. They
are usually stable conditions which, until the onset of aging and the
resultant deterioration, may be objectively measured. As a result, an
accurate assessment of a handicapped person's present ability means
that future ability can be reasonably predicted without the fear of
diminished capacity resulting from the handicap. In contrast, the
aging employee may have no single physical problem, but may man-
ifest such symptoms as loss of memory, loss of manual dexterity, or
overall slowing down of the bodily processes. These are progressive
conditions which may not be easily isolated and assessed for purposes
of determining present work ability.
Depending upon who is included in the class of handicapped per-
sons, 89 there may be handicaps which are degenerative or rehabilita-
tive, and thus do not differ substantially from aging. The distinction
84. See Note, Age Discuinination, supra note 49, at 384.
85. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
86. See Note, Age Discrimination, supra note 49, at 384.
87. It may be useful for purposes of analysis to imagine a continuum with race at one end
where there exists virtually no relationship between ability and the distinguishing trait (except,
for example, where it results from inferior education); then sex, which sometimes, though
rarely, may pertain to ability; religion which, while the practices themselves may interfere with
the performance of tasks, such interference is nonetheless due to the voluntary decision to
adhere to one religion or another; to handicaps which may or may not affect ability; to age
which will predictably affect ability at some point. Along this continuum there exists a progres-
sive correlation between the extent to which ability relates to the class factor (race, sex, hand-
icap), and the existence or absence of prejudices and ill-feelings which may have resulted in a
history against the given class. With blacks the animosity is most prevalent, while with older
workers it is virtually absent.
88. Kovarsky, supra note 83, at 851.
89. See Section IV of text at 981.
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between age and handicap is further blurred by the fact that the
aging process may precipitate a handicap; an elderly person may be-
come mobility-disabled. However, the limited experience with dis-
crimination based on handicap indicates that a large percentage of the
conditions which constitute the basis of discrimination are those
which are permanent or stable over a period of time. 9°
Because of the observed differences, the case law regarding age,
part4cularly where physical ability is at issue, cannot be engrafted
onto the handicapped without further analysis. The cases must be
examined closely to discern what disabilities are involved and
whether the prior case of age discrimination is analogous to the in-
stant case involving handicapped persons. The following discussion
illustrates that one of the most significant differences between age
and handicap is that the blanket exclusion which is permissible for all
persons of a certain age, can never exist for persons with a certain
handicap.
2. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
A bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) permits an employer
an exception from the general prohibition against policies which dis-
criminate against a designated class and allows a policy which abso-
lutely excludes all members of a protected class from a particular job
regardless of any individual's qualifications or abilities. The exemption
is contained in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 91
and Title VII. 92 The BFOQ has been narrowly interpreted in cases of
sex discrimination, 93 and more liberally construed in cases of age dis-
90. For example, between September 1, 1974, and December 31, 1975, 591 complaints
were filed in New York alleging employment discrimination based on handicap. A partial listing
of the complaints includes 26 involving cardiac problems, 36 cases involving motor disabilities,
44 eye problems, 54 cases involving hearing problems (of which 32 persons were totally deaf),
15 cases involving diabetes, 5 cases involving speech problems, 19 cases involving stomach
problems, 5 cases involving allergies, and 29 cases involving epilepsy. Of the 591 complaints,
there were also 92 "'miscellaneous" disabilities. New York State Division of Human Rights, Fact
Sheet on Disability Complaints filed September 1, 1974-December 31, 1975.
91. 29 U.S C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1) (1970). Under this subsection there exists a BFOQ for all
categories except race.
93. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). But
see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). There the Supreme Court upheld a state regu-
lation which e-;cluded women as prison guards in all-male penetentiaries. The Court sustained
the exclusive policy as a valid bona fide occupational qualification. A detailed review of the case
reveals no standard which can be derived from the case and applied in other situations. On the
contrary, the case appears to be based solely upon the facts, and limited to that extent. The
absence of any clear discernible standard renders this case an aberration and should be treated
as such.
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crimination. 94  The cases reflect the overall principle that the charac-
teristic which gives rise to the exemption should be one which di-
rectly relates to the business, and which, if not permitted, would in
some way undermine the operations. 95 It necessitates a showing by
the employer that the particular characteristics which the excluded
class lacks are necessary for performance of the job and that the as-
pects of the job for which the BFOQ is claimed embody the essence or
purpose of the business. 96  Beyond these common principles, courts
have applied different tests for different classes.9 7
The problems peculiar to the handicapped which bear upon the
possibility of a BFOQ are similar to those pertaining to statistical
data.98 Because the BFOQ permits the blanket disqualification of a class
without regard to individual abilities, this necessitates a definable
class constituency. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 99 a case alleging sex discrimination, the Fifth Circuit_ required
a "factual basis" from which the court could conclude that
"... all or substantially all [members of a protected class] would
be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved." '00
If a court applied the above test to the handicapped, any class or
subclass of persons would suffer from overbreadth. The variations in
degree of impairment among persons with a specific handicap simply
make it impossible to generalize about the abilities of all persons with
that condition. 101 The alternative is to focus on a small identifiable
group of handicapped persons. When this is done, a lawful refusal to
hire because of a highly particularized handicap amounts to a just
refusal to hire because of actual inability to perform. Once the
excludable class becomes sufficiently specific so as not to suffer from
94. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
95. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971).
96. Id. at 388.
97. Compare, e.g., Weeks supra note 93 with Greyhound supra note 94 which flatly re-
jected the Weeks test.
98. See text accompanying and following note 66 supra.
99. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
100. Id. at 235.
101. For example, deaf persons may include the partially deaf and the totally deaf, those who
can speak and those who cannot, those who can "sign" and those who cannot. Similarly, the
mobility-disabled as a class include those confined to wheelchairs and persons who are mobile
with crutches and other aids. There are also varying degrees of visual impairments, ranging
from minor problems correctable with glasses to total blindness.
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overbreadth,- it is then composed of persons who, by virtue of their
handicap, are not qualified to perform the job. 10 2  The rejection is
not, therefore, discrimination on the basis of handicap to which a BFOQ
defense may be raised, but instead is a lawful refusal to hire those
unable to do the job.
In contrast, the cases governing BFOQ for age can be distinguished
not necessarily because the tests are inappropriate, but because the
factual bases from which the courts derived the tests render the situa-
tions distinguishable from cases involving the handicapped. Two
leading age discrimination cases challenged blanket policies which
excluded persons above a certain age from consideration for jobs as
bus drivers. 10 3 In sustaining the employer's policies, both courts
were persuaded that the particular stresses involved in the jobs,
coupled with the presence of subtle bodily changes, constituted too
great a risk to customers to deny the BFOQ.104 This distinguishes the
protected class of persons over forty' 05 from the substantial number
of handicapped persons who have fixed, identifiable and stable condi-
tions. 106
A BFOQ because of safety considers both safety to customers and to
the individual applicant or employee. Again, the variations in the
conditions and their severity preclude a class-based generalization
about the risk factors involved in hiring handicapped persons gener-
ally. For the handicapped, only an individualized approach to safety
is possible. But once safety is considered on an individual case-by-
102. For example, to specify that applications of deaf persons who cannot sign, speak, or read
lips will not be considered is to describe the very individuals who cannot perform the job.
103. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
104. In Greyhound, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Weeks standard for BFOQ and instead
formulated a new standard applicable in cases involving public safety. The new standard
adopted the Diaz requirement of business essence (see text accompanying notes 95 & 96 supra),
coupled with special considerations noted by another court in a non-BFOQ case, which also
involved the transportation of passengers. Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th
Cir. 1972). What emerged in Greyhound was a test which required the defendant to de-
monstrate a "rational basis in fact" to believe that public safety would be endangered by elimi-
nation of the rule. 499 F.2d at 863. Applying the rule to the facts addressed at trial, the court
determined that Greyhound met this burden and therefore permitted the 40-year maximum age
requirement to stand. Contrary to the Greyhound courts, the Tanliai court was satisfied with
the Weeks-Diaz standards combined to form a flexible text which sufficiently accounted for the safety
factor.
For an excellent analysis of these two cases, see Note, Age Discrimination, note 49 supra, at
400-10.
105. The protected age group under the ADEA is forty to seventy years of age. Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub, L. No. 95-256, § 12, 92 Stat. 189
(amending 29 U.S.C. 633 (1967)).
106. See note 90 supra.
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case basis, it loses the quality of a BFOQ which warrants the exclusion
of an entire class. 10 7  Instead, it necessitates a broadened definition
of "ability" to perform a job which accounts for safety to the indi-
vidual. Safety can and must remain a factor in the employment deci-
sion, but its proper place for handicapped persons will always be at
the initial employment stage when an individual's abilities are asses-
sed. 108
Finally, the notion of reasonable accommodation to the job con-
templates an adjustment or modification tailored to the specific needs
of a handicapped individual. This adjustment to the individual pre-
cludes the possibility of an exemption for a class of individuals. Com-
pounded by the difficulty in defining a class of handicapped per-
sons-either because of overbreadth or specificity so narrow as to
bear on actual ability-a BFOQ for the handicapped becomes wholly
implausible. If an individual accommodation is required, class-based
exclusions cannot co-exist.
The standard which evolves requires that a handicapped individual
be able to perform safely and efficiently the essential functions of the
job with reasonable accommodation. 10 9 If any element is missing, he
or she can be denied employment. Where a refusal to hire is chal-
lenged, the employer can be required to come forth with evidence to
justify the refusal by showing a 'factual basis to believe that the indi-
107. See, e.g., Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976). There the court held that an employer's
discharge and refusal to hire two diabetics for jobs as welders constituted unlawful discrimina-
tion based on handicap under the state statute. The employer's actions.were taken pursuant to a
blanket policy which excluded all diabetics from employment, and which the employer sought
to justify on the ground that some diabetics could be a substantial hazard to themselves or other
employees. Although never articulated as such, the employer's justification that "some" is suffi-
cient to disqualify all, was an attempt to establish a BFOQ. The problem with this argument is
reflected in the court's opinion:
While the petitioner did demonstrate that individual diabetics may be unqualified
to fill the position of welder in a shipyard because those persons may have history
of blackouts or may be so severely disabled by the disease as to require precise
regularity of schedule, the petitioner made no such showing with respect to these
claimants.
In Ihct, the record contains ample evidence that claimants . .. are capable of
performing the tasks required by the petitioner. Each claimant has approximately
one-half to one hour advance notice that he either needs to ingest sugar or to
consume liquid and exercise. Neither . . . has ever blacked out from the disease.
Both have done and continue to do strenuous work.
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1810 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (emphasis added).
108. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 28 Or. App. 747, 561 P.2d 637
(1977). There the court properly considered safety of the individual applicant to be part of the
criteria upon which an initial employment decision may be based.
109. See note 21 supra.
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vidual could not perform the essential functions of the job safely and
efficiently with reasonable accommodation." This proposed standard
retains the required factual showing of Weeks, 110 thereby removing
the speculative problem often present in employment decisions about
the handicapped. Unlike Weeks, it applies on an individual and not a
class basis, and for this reason, the proposal is not a BFOQ. It is, how-
ever, a balance between the employer's need and obligation to run a
safe business I" and the handicapped's need to be assured of consid-
eration for employment, except in those cases where there is a de-
monstrable basis for the refusal."12
IV. STATUTORY SCOPE: DEFINING THE PROTECTED CLASS
A. Background
This Article ends where it began by focusing on the principles of
fair employment laws; merit and capabilities are to be the controlling
factors, assumptions and prejudices cannot and should not dictate
employment decisions. The overall goal of equal employment oppor-
tunities is to allow all handicapped persons to compete equally with
each other and with nonhandicapped persons for the available jobs.
The specific goals of equal treatment and equal achievement necessi-
tate the removal of both attitudinal and physical barriers. With these
goals as a backdrop, this section will consider the question of who is
appropriately included in the class of handicapped individuals. The
discussion will assume that laws proscribing employment discrimina-
tion against the handicapped should include the mentally and physi-
110. See text preceding and accompanying note 100 supra.
111. Under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA), an employer is obligated to:
[fQurnish . . . a place of employment .. . free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees .... 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)
(1970).
112. This means, of course, that in some situations the employer will have to solicit informa-
tion from the applicant regarding his or her medical history and treatment. To the extent that
this is prohibited by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare regulations interpreting
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, they are simply unworkable. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14
(1977). (Provision governing pre-employment inquiries.) The requirements made of employers in
this area cannot be underestimated. By refusing to allow an employer to inquire about medical
histories or handicaps, he or she is forced into the untenable position of basing employment
decisions on insufficient information regarding an individual's handicap. The employer must
then hope that if a decision not to hire the handicapped individual is challenged, the facts
adduced during discovery regarding. the individual's condition will be sufficient to justify the
original decision.
This provision presents an additional problem. It is axiomatic that if an employer is to attempt
a reasonable accommodation to determine initially whether an individual can perform the essen-
tial functions of a job, he or she must be apprised of the handicapping condition. It appears,
however, that HEW has simply not thought through the application of these regulations and
ironed out the internal inconsistencies.
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cally handicapped. It will also be assumed that, at the very least,
these laws should protect persons with permanent disabilities or im-
pairments.
B. Temporary and Perceived Handicaps
The assumptions and stereotypes which have operated to exclude
handicapped persons from employment are not limited to permanent
handicaps. In fact, it is more likely that an employer will make as-
sumptions about the extent of a temporary impairment for the very
reason that it is temporary. While an employer can at least grasp with
some certainty and measure to some extent a permanent handicap,
this certainty may be frequently absent in the case involving a tern-
porary disability. Consequently, he or she may be even more prone
to dismiss from consideration a person with a temporary handicap
because of its elusive quality. 1 13
Furthermore, employers often engage in assumptions about the ex-
tent to which a condition impairs ability. But these assumptions are
no less likely to occur in the case of a temporary condition than in the
case of a permanent condition. In either instance, the employer may
assume ability is impaired. If an employer is permitted to make as-
sumptions about temporary conditions, it is highly probable that he
or she will transfer those same assumptions to permanently handicap-
ped persons. It is -simply not possible to contain stereotyping strictly
to one group, when both suffer from the same condition that gives
rise to the stereotype. To the extent an employer is permitted to
indulge in assumptions about temporary disabilities, these will color
his or her view of permanent handicaps, irrespective of whether it is
legal or not. 114
113. The number of persons suffering from temporary disabilities is not insignificant. There
are a reported 12.5 million temporarily injured people in this country. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13,
1977, § 4 (The Week in Review) at 8, col. 1.
114. See Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976). The court
there held that whiplash was a temporary condition which was not within the meaning of the
Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. This decision was based on the court's reading of
the following definition:
'Physical handicap' means any physical disability, infirmity, malformation or dis-
figurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness, including
epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be limited to, any degree of paralysis,
amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness
or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a
seeing eye dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(h) (emphasis added).
The court read the list of handicaps contained in the statute to be exclusive, despite the clear
language to the contrary. But more importantly, the court's decision supports the position set
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The overriding concern is, therefore, one of stereotypes, and any-
thing which fosters or maintains these attitudes should, to the extent
possible, fall within the broad proscription. It is unlikely that
stereotypes against permanently handicapped persons will be broken
down if they are permitted in the case of temporary disabilities. Pre-
judices, attitudes and stereotypes are not so neatly compartment-
alized, packaged up and pulled out depending on the length of time
the particular condition will last. An employer who is permitted to
deny employment to a lawyer with a broken leg because it is assumed
that a lawyer needs the full use of two legs to be effective as a
litigator, cannot be expected to hire a person whose left leg is
paralyzed. However desirable it may appear to distinguish between
the two in terms of what the law requires, such a distinction is not
made in the day-to-day employment practices. It is a highly formalis-
tic distinction which, if permitted to survive, would render the laws a
virtual nullity. It is more reflective of the way lawyers and legislators
think than the way employers run businesses. 115
For the same reasons, a distinction cannot be maintained between
real and perceived handicaps. When an employer regards an indi-
vidual as handicapped and denies him or her employment for that
reason, such a rejection must be considered illegal discrimination. If
an employer may deny employment to a person whom he or she
forth here. The evidence established that prior to her termination, the employee had satisfac-
torily performed her job for three weeks. She was discharged on the basis of her condition
(whiplash) only after it was discovered during the course of her employment physical. Obvi-
ously, the employer viewed it as a handicap irrespective of whether it was permanent or not. In
addition, the fact that she had worked successfully for three weeks clearly substantiated a find-
ing that she was able to perform the job. Under the court's view, if the neck condition had been
permanent and not temporary, the individual would have been protected by the Act.
Nevertheless, the same assumption would still have operated to exclude this capable employee
from continued employment. This points up the anomalous situation which is created by omit-
ting temporary conditions from coverage and exemplifies the hurdles which handicapped per-
sons must overcome to prove their capabilities.
115. Arguably, the inclusion of temporary disabilities could have the effect of diluting the
protection for the severely handicapped. This could occur by making employers resentful of the
broad coverage under such statutes, thereby increasing the hostility toward handicapped per-
sons generally. However, studies which have been conducted regarding employment of the
handicapped refute such an outcome. These studies indicate that favorable past experiences
with disabled individuals contribute to the development of positive attitudes on the part of
employers and to the actual rehiring of the workers. Nagi & Collette, supra note 46, at 25.
Thus, the effect upon employers is more properly focused on how the employees ultimately
perform rather than whether the disability is of a permanent or temporary nature.
Beyond this, the question is purely one of balancing the interests of the handicapped, to
determine whether they are best served by including or excluding temporary disabilities. For
the reasons discussed throughout this article, it is the position here that the handicapped will be
best served by including temporary disabilities.
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erroneously believes to be asthmatic, a fortiori, the employer will
never hire someone who is in fact asthmatic. Whether the individual
is actually handicapped or perceived to be handicapped, the same
stereotypes are operative. To condone one situation but not the other
creates an inherent contradiction. Again it is a formal legal distinction
which, once placed in the employment setting quickly disappears. An
employer simply will not, and cannot be expected to differentiate at-
titudes in such a manner.
C. Present Ability
There is the additional issue of whether present ability should be
assessed in the employment setting or whether ability should include
predictions about future abilities. The position here is that as with all
other protected classes, the proper consideration is whether a hand-
icapped individual is presently capable of performing the job. For the
handicapped, the present ability is further measured by performance
of the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation.
This discussion does not deal with the instance of an applicant who,
with certainty, will be unable to work in two or three months sub-
sequent. Rather, most cases of this nature involve speculation about
an individual who, although presently able to perform the job, is
nonetheless denied employment because at some future date he or
she "might" be rendered unable to work because of a particular con-
dition.' 16 Back injuries are among the most recurring conditions. 117
In these cases, handicapped persons are evaluated on the basis of
116. See Chrysler Outboard Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations,
14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976). There the court rejected the employer's
refusal to hire a person with leukemia. The company sought to justify its refusal on the basis of
(1) risk of future absences, and (2) insurance costs. In rejecting both rationales, the court ob-
served that tle statute was written in the present tense, and precluded employment decisions
based on speculation that the individual might, at some future date, be unable to perform the
job. See also Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 938, 215 N.W.2d 443 (Wis. 1974).
117. See, e.g., Hoadley v. Olin Corp., No. 7400142 (Wis. DILHR 1976). In an unreported
decision, the State Department held the discharge of an employee who had previously sustained
a back injury, to be discrimination based on handicap in violation of the state statute. The
hearing examiner's decision, sustained on appeal, indicates that there was no evidence in the
record that the discharged employee was unable to perform the assigned duties. In her Accom-
panying Memorandum, the hearing examiner stated:
"Nonetheless, the law does not permit physicians or others to restrict persons with
disabilities from perforning jobs that they are capable of performing because of
speculation that the employee may injure himself. . . . In this case, the Complainant
was iable to perform his handyman's duties at the standards set by the Respondent
... ."Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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assumptions about their abilities, both future and present, instead of
what they are actually able to do.
Certain safeguards for the employer are built into the recommenda-
tion that present ability should control. The definition of "ability" as
set forth earlier in the article, 118 includes factors of safety to the indi-
vidual and customers, as well as business efficiency. This broad def-
inition of ability coupled with the requirement that present ability be
determinative, protects the employer's interests while at the same
time removing speculation regarding future ability from the employ-
ment decision.
D. Voluntary and Involuntary Conditions
The final question is whether voluntary and involuntary conditions
should be included within the scope of a protected class for the
handicapped. Such conditions as obesity and alcoholism 119 are two
prime examples. As in the case of temporary disabilities, to permit
discrimination where the condition is voluntary, but prohibit it when
it is medically based, is to make a distinction which doe's little to
dispel stereotyped assumptions. For example, from the employer's
viewpoint, all obese persons are perceived similarly. In order to dis-
courage any assumptions about obese people, coverage should be ex-
tended to all or to none.
Whether the particular conditions are voluntary or not, all persons
suffering from the handicap are susceptible to the same assumptions
and the same discrimination. In addition, at some point a voluntary
condition becomes involuntary, blurring the distinction that much
more. 120  To protect only the involuntary conditions sets up the
anomalous situation of protecting persons suffering from the same
condition on the basis of origin. 121 While the society may initially
118. See text following note 109 supra.
119. See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1811 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1975). There the court upheld
the Department's finding of unlawful discrimination based on the handicap of alcoholism. The
court reasoned that as with other conditions, employer's fears regarding alcoholism may consti-
tute discrimination unrelated to ability. See also Davis v. Bucher, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 918
(E.D. Pa. 1978); 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1977) [Appendix A (A)(4)].
120. A person may initially drink voluntarily. But an alcoholic no longer has control of his
drinking and is instead considered to suffer from a disease. This view of alcoholism as a disease
has gained some recognition in the courts. See, e.g., Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
121. Obesity can result from overeating or from a medically diagnosable problem. Arguably,
a statute could extend protection in the case of overweight due to physiological causes but not
when it results from overeating. As noted earlier, the employer's perceptions in either instance
will be identical. Furthermore, overeating may in itself be attributed to emotional or
psychological problems, placing the condition back under the statutory scope. This circuity is
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feel greater sympathy for the involutarily handicapped, the source of
the problem, once it is recognized to be a problem, has little rele-
vance. These fine distinctions simply do not take account of the prac-
tical effects in the work setting.
What emerges is no doubt a far broader protection than many
people initially sought or contemplated. But it is essential if all hand-
icapped people are to be upgraded to the level of equal opportunity
to achieve. Both the prejudices and erroneous assumptions which
have operated to exclude the mentally and physically handicapped
must be shattered. Fine distinctions between permanent and tempor-
ary, actual and perceived, cannot be maintained if the net effect is to
perpetuate the attitudes sought to be destroyed. The protection must
be extended to include the less than permanently handicapped, not
only because they, too, are victimized by the discrimination, but also
because anything less than that will detract from the protection of the
severely handicapped.
V, CONCLUSION
There are two tasks which confront this society once the decision is
made to protect the mentally and physically handicapped from dis-
crimination in employment. First, the discriminatory practices must
be made illegal. This requires a sensitivity to the special needs of this
class and a recognition that equal opportunities are achieved differ-
ently for different classes. There is no single panacea which will suit
all protected persons. Accordingly, a BFOQ based on race is impermis-
sible. For the handicapped, a reasonable accomodation may be re-
quired. It is not favored treatment, but the mature realization that
each class comes with its own unique characteristics.
Second, through legislation and education, existing prejudices
must be eroded. If a solution is properly fashioned and handicapped
persons are integrated into the mainstream of the work force, experi-
ence indicates a correlation between the development of positive at-
titudes by employers toward the handicapped and their experience
with handicapped workers. 122  As with other minorities, 123 it may
inevitable if the distinction is maintained between the voluntary and involuntary condition.
Accord, Johnson v. City of New York, No. (S) GCD-36562-75 (N.Y. Div. HR. 1976) (holding a
refusal to hire because of obesity to constitute unlawful discrimination based on handicap).
122. Nagi & Collette, supra note 46, at 25.
123. A ten-year study by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan
reported that increased contact of wlites with blacks caused a shift in attitudes by whites from
negative to positive. The researchers concluded that with this increase in contact between the
races, whites accordingly grew more accepting of blacks. While the research is by no means
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be deduced that the full integration of handicapped persons into a
wide range of employment situations will succeed in breaking down
the prejudices and stereotypes regarding mentally and physically
handicapped persons. And from that, fair employment practices will
flow.
conclusive, particularly because the improvement in attitudes generally was not as marked in
employment as in other areas, it still suggests that overall increased contact and exposure
between people helps to break down negative attitudes and prejudices. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1975, at 1, col. 2.

